This paper addresses the problem of automated detection of Z-calls emitted by Antarctic blue whales (B. m. intermedia). The proposed solution is based on a subspace detector of sigmoidal-frequency signals with unknown time-varying amplitude. This detection strategy takes into account frequency variations of blue whale calls as well as the presence of other transient sounds that can interfere with Z-calls (such as airguns or other whale calls). The proposed method has been tested on more than 105 hours of acoustic data containing about 2200 Z-calls (as found by an experienced human operator). This method is shown to have a correct-detection rate of up to more than 15% better than XBAT, a spectrogram-based correlation detector commonly used to study blue whales. Because the proposed method relies on subspace detection, it does not suffer from some drawbacks of correlation-based detectors.
I Introduction
Monitoring cetaceans using passive acoustic methods is a popular survey strategy. It overcomes some of the limitations of visual surveys especially in large and remote areas (e.g. the Southern ocean) and it is relevant to study elusive and endangered species (e.g. the Antarctic blue whale). Most of our recent knowledge on Antarctic blue whale distribution in the southern hemisphere is derived from long-term passive acoustic monitoring [1] [2] [3] . Antarctic blue whales emit almost year-round, stereotyped long and low frequency calls with high intensity also called "Z-shaped" sounds or "Z-calls". These calls consist of three tonal units lasting up to 26 s, and repeated in patterned sequences every 40-50 s over periods extending from a few minutes to hours [4] [5] [6] [7] . The first component is a constant frequency tone at 27 Hz (with inter-annual / seasonal variations usually between 28 and 26 Hz) followed by a short frequency-modulated down-sweep from 27 Hz to 20 Hz ending with the third component, a slightly modulated tone . Antarctic blue whale calls can be detected from several tens to hundreds of kilometers by passive acoustic monitoring systems [8, 9] and are a cue of their presence in the study area [3] . Long-term passive acoustic monitoring aims at understanding the seasonal distribution and occurrence of whale species. With a network of instruments, their distribution and movements can be assessed.
However, the collected acoustic data, even at relatively low sampling rates, can easily amount to multiple gigabytes or terabytes of which the analysis can be challenging. It is thus generally impractical to analyze all the data in real time or manually. The way to efficiency process such large amount of acoustic records has been the subject of many efforts in the past twenty years and has resulted in a robust body of literature on automated detection methods.
Most methods are based on detection either in time series or in spectrograms. Techniques involved for mysticete calls and particularly for blue whale calls detection include matchedfilters [7, 10] , spectrogram-based template matching [11, 12] , multivariate classification [2] , and other approaches (e.g. [13, 14] ). Choosing the best tool is crucial for analyzing acoustic datasets with respect to the occurrence and density estimation of whales in the study area.
However, the outcome largely depends on the time-frequency characteristics of the signal of interest in the specific ambient noise of the monitored area.
Antarctic blue whale calls are highly stereotyped, simple, and repetitive and therefore are good candidates for many automated detection methods. However, due to the relatively long and tonal characteristics of the calls, signals from multiple Antarctic blue whales or calls produce by others baleen whale species in the same frequency range can overlap. As a consequence, the lack of distinction between overlapping signals can lead to underestimation of the actual number of calls. Moreover, Antarctic blue whales calls can be produced in a varying and unpredictable ambient noise composed of many interferences such as earthquakes, airguns or ship noise. These interferences can dramatically reduce the performance of the automated detection methods. Antarctic blue whales can produce Z-calls every [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] sec resulting in, potentially, thousands of detections over a year that can be laborious to quality control or even analyze. Finally, the choice of automated detectors as well as the knowledge of their respective performance are crucial to best exploit the long-term passive acoustic dataset, especially when detection results are used for statistical methods such as density estimation from calling animals. At this step, assessing the number of missed calls and the number of false detections becomes important [15] .
In this paper, we address the problem of detecting Z-calls with two objectives in mind that are not jointly fulfilled by existing methods. The first objective is to design a detection strategy that explicitly deals with the possible presence of unwanted transient signals and also allows for Z-calls to differ in frequency, amplitude or in duration from one observation to another. As detailed in this work, this requirement is met by modeling a multidimensional subspace where most of the Z-call energy lies rather than by modeling the signal itself as in matched-filter-based methods. In addition, we explicitly assume that, due to the fluctuation of the oceanic environment, part of the Z-call energy does not lie in the modeled subspace and, more importantly, that interfering transient signals may present partial similarities with Antarctic blue whale sounds.
The second objective is to provide a method with formal and controlled detection performance that does not require ad-hoc procedures relying on extensive Monte-Carlo simulations or (subjective) human inspection of real data. As stated previously, managing the detection performance can be crucial for higher level analysis such as animal density estimation. The relation between the decision threshold of our detector and its false alarm as well as its detection probabilities is explicitly derived in this paper. While fulfilling our two objectives, the proposed detection strategy is shown to present some properties of optimality with respect to detection performance.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, the experimental data are described and the observation model is formulated. Sec. III presents the detection strategy as well as its associated theoretical performance. Its actual performance is illustrated in Sec. IV and compared with XBAT, a spectrogram-based detector. Finally, conclusions are given in Sec.
V.
Notation: Throughout this paper, lowercase boldface letters denote vectors, e.g., x, and uppercase boldface letters denote matrices, e.g., A. The superscripts T and † mean transposition and Hermitian transposition, respectively. We let diag(x) designate a diagonal square matrix whose main diagonal contains the elements of vector x. The N × N identity matrix is denoted by I N . H is the subspace that is spanned by the columns of matrix H. sup denotes the supremum of a given subset and ⌊·⌋ the floor function. The distribution of a jointly proper Gaussian random vector with mean m and covariance matrix Σ is denoted CN (m, Σ). Finally, E {·} denotes expectation and P(·) is the probability measure.
II Experimental data and observation model A Dataset
Three autonomous hydrophones were deployed near the French territories in the Southern Indian Ocean from October 2006 to January and April 2008 [16] . The objective of the project was to monitor low-frequency acoustic signals, including those produced by large whales [17] .
The three instruments were widely spaced and located in the Madagascar Basin (hereinafter As shown in Figure 1 and observed in previous analyses [4, 9, 18] , Z-calls from Antarctic blue whales are all included in a frequency band ranging approximately from 15 Hz to 30
Hz. To limit the processing time of estimation and detection algorithms, the original signal was band-pass filtered between 15 Hz and 30 Hz, converted to a complex baseband signal [19] and downsampled at a 18 Hz sampling frequency f s . As detailed thereafter, Antarctic blue whales share the 15-30 Hz frequency channel with other transient sound sources that can either be anthropogenic, biological or abiotic. Therefore, given an observation window of N samples, the observation vector y ∈ C N is here represented as
where s ∈ C N designates a blue whale call, ψ ∈ C N is some transient signal of no interest and w ∈ C N is the background noise. µ and ǫ are random variables valued in {0, 1} modeling the possible presence or absence of s and ψ, respectively. The blue whale call detection strategy strongly depends on the nature of the three components s, ψ and w. Therefore, as a preliminary phase to detection, the properties of each of these components are presented in the next subsections.
Time (s)
Frequency ( 
B Antarctic blue whale calls
As described in previous studies [7, 18] and shown in Figure 1 , Z-calls present a very discriminative time-frequency structure. This type of call has a "sigmoidal" shape that does not vary much from one call to the next. Note however that variants of this call consisting of the first tonal component only are sometimes observed [5, 6] .
The relative simplicity of Z-shaped patterns makes parametric modeling possible. Indeed, s can be well approximated by frequency modulated signals, also named "chirps", of the form
where the amplitude a(·) and the phase φ(·) are smoothly varying functions of time. Given the sigmoidal patterns that are shown by spectrograms, we suggest to model the timevarying phase based on a logistic model for the instantaneous frequency. More precisely, we assume that the instantaneous frequency can be expressed, prior to sampling and baseband conversion, as
where f c is the central frequency of the 15-30 Hz bandwidth, i.e., f c = 22.5. L, U, α, M denote the lower asymptote, upper asymptote, growth rate and time shift of the logistic function,
respectively. An example of this logistic function is shown in Figure 2 . The relation between φ(·) and f (·) in (3) yields the following model for the discrete time-varying phase
where ϕ 0 is the initial phase. 
C Interference
Our observation system experiences interference generated by surrounding transient sources that share the same frequency bandwidth as Antarctic blue whales. 
D Background noise
Background noise results from the mixture of numerous unidentifiable ambient sound sources.
As opposed to what is called interference in this work, background noise does not include any transient signal. A particularity of the 15-30 Hz bandwidth is that part of the background noise energy is due to the chorus emanating from very distant blue whale calls. From a detection perspective, this noise w
T is a random process and is thus entirely characterized by the joint cumulative distribution function (cdf) of its variables 
No parametric model is assumed for Σ but, as discussed in Sec. III.D, the knowledge of this matrix is required for setting the detection threshold of the proposed detection strategy.
On the basis of observations, this covariance matrix can be fairly well estimated, even in the presence of transient signals s and ψ as long as their probability of occurrence is not too important. A simple robust estimation procedure for Σ is discussed in Appendix A. It will be used to estimate Σ on the experimental data (see Sec. IV).
III Detection strategy
Based on the observation model (1) and for each observation window of size N, our detection problem consists in deciding whether µ equals 0 or 1. The decision must be made whether the observation contains interfering signals (ǫ = 1) or not (ǫ = 0). This problem can be cast in the standard binary hypothesis testing framework:
Null hypothesis H 0 : µ = 0,
In the absence of exact knowledge on both s and ψ, matched-filter-based detectors or likelihood ratio tests cannot be employed (complete knowledge of the distribution of y under H 0 and H 1 cannot be assumed). To deal with this lack of knowledge on s and ψ, we propose a detection strategy that belongs to the family of "subspace detectors". As proposed by Scharf in [21] and latter extended in [22] [23] [24] [25] , subspace detectors generalize matched-filters by accommodating signals that are not perfectly known but are only constrained to lie in a multidimensional subspace. Such types of detectors are widely used in radar and sonar applications. In the following subsection, the theory of subspace detectors is briefly reviewed to then be adapted to Problem (5) 
A Subspace detectors
Subspace detectors are typically employed when, given a noisy observation y = µs + w, the signal s to be detected is a linear combination of p modes or basis vectors. In this case, s may be represented as s = Hθ, where H is a known N × p matrix and θ is p × 1 vector that contains the coordinates of s in the subspace spanned by the columns of H. A simple example that fits in this model is the detection of a signal that is a sum of two cosinusoids, i.e.
Model (6) can also be written as a linear combination of p = 4 modes, i.e.,
. . .
In the case where H and θ are known a priori by the detector (i.e., s is fully known), the matched-filter test can be applied and is equivalent to comparing the decision statistic y † s to some threshold [21, Ch. 4.9] . However, in many applications such as radar, telecommunications or underwater acoustics, the propagation medium modifies the amplitude and the phase of the signal of interest so that θ is unknown. In this case, the theory of "matched subspace detectors" shows that the resolution onto a template, as used by the matched-filter, is replaced by a projection onto the signal subspace [21, Ch. 4.11]. The decision statistic is then proportional to y † P H y, where
subspace H . This statistic can also be written as P H y 2 , which represents the energy of y in subspace H . Subspace detectors are largely employed in signal processing because, in many cases, they satisfy strong optimality properties with respect to detection/false alarm probabilities [22] .
B Subspace of Z-calls
Applying a subspace detection strategy to Problem (5) first implies to define a subspace where most of the Z-call energy does lie. Such a subspace can be determined based on model (2)-(4). Assume for now that the time-frequency shape of all Z-calls is constant, i.e., L, U are perfectly known (this assumption will be relaxed soon). In this case, the Z-call variability is due to the amplitude a(·) and the initial phase ϕ 0 . Although random, high SNR observations show that this amplitude presents rather smooth time fluctuations. From a modeling perspective, this means that a Z-call s can be well approximated by a signal that has a time-varying phase described by (4) and an unknown time-varying amplitude that is piecewise constant with p pieces. s can therefore be represented as a linear combination of
where H is a N × p matrix with h l
T the l-th basis vector of size N p and φ(·) the time varying phase defined in (4) . A l denotes the amplitude of the l-th signal piece and, as ϕ 0 , it is assumed unknown.
As discussed in Sec. II.B, sounds produced by different whales as well as propagation variability may induce slight fluctuations of Z-calls time-frequency patterns (i.e., L and U are not constant). These fluctuations can easily be taken into account by extending the dimension of subspace H . More precisely, we propose to build a new multidimensional linear subspace spanned by a matrix Z that concatenates three N × p matrices,
, each with its own set of parameters (L,U). Given the one Hz variability of L and U observed on our dataset, H (1) , H (2) and H (3) are built as in (7), with (L, U) = (−3, 4), (L, U) = (−3.5, 4.5) and (L, U) = (−4, 5), respectively. Each Z-call is therefore modeled as
where θ is the 3p × 1 vector that contains the unknown amplitudes and the unknown initial phase ϕ 0 . The projection matrix onto Z is defined as
Note that the choice of the values (L, U) is data-dependent. This is important to emphasize specifically because recent studies revealed a decrease over time in the tonality of Antarctic blue whale song [18, [26] [27] [28] .
Model (8) is obviously an approximation of reality but this approximation is valid in that most of the Z-call energy actually lies in subspace Z . In other words, s † P Z s, the energy of the projection of s onto subspace Z , represents a large amount of its total energy s † s when p is chosen large enough. Numerical analyses with high SNR observations and of size N = 15 × f s show that choosing p = 4 is enough to get 75% of the total energy of s in Z .
Note that as p increases, this ratio of energy increases as well but the chosen model becomes less discriminant. In the extreme case with p = N, any random signal of size N will satisfy
Using a subspace model for Z-calls is also very useful to bound our lack of knowledge on the interferences presented in Sec. II.C. As stated previously, parametric modeling of interfering signals is not possible because they are very heterogeneous. However, they have not much in common with Z-calls. Using model (8) for s, such a difference can be formally transcribed. Indeed, the dissemblance between a blue whale call s and any interference ψ can be expressed by the fact that most of the interference energy does not lie in subspace
Real data analysis suggests that, for p = 4, τ is lesser than 0.15 in most cases. However, note that most interferences are not orthogonal to Z-calls (i.e., τ > 0) because of partial time-frequency similarities.
C Detection structure
Although s and ψ are not perfectly known, the properties of s and ψ in relation to subspace Z gives relevant information with respect to detection. More precisely, let x be defined as
Based on the analysis in Sec. III.B, conclusions on the energy of x in subspace Z can be drawn for the four possible values of the pair (µ, ǫ):
• (µ, ǫ) = (0, 1): there is no Z-call, from (9) it follows that
• (µ, ǫ) = (1, 0): a Z-call is present without overlapping interferences, from (8) it follows that
• (µ, ǫ) = (1, 1): both a Z-call and an interfering sound are present. This case is not as "binary" as the previous ones. However, we recall that less than τ = 15% of the interference power lies in subspace Z , whereas more of 75% of the Z-call power lies in Z . Therefore, as long as the interference power is in the same order of magnitude as the power of the signal of interest s, we can reasonably assume that
Obviously, overlaps of Z-calls with high power interferences will automatically decrease the value of
(see Sec. IV.A for a numerical analysis of the impact of
on the detection performance.).
On the basis of these elements, the initial detection problem (5) can then be recast as follows:
Null hypothesis H 0 :
Alternative hypothesis H 1 :
Problem (11) is based on hypotheses that involve x. However, only noisy observation y is available, so that further theory is needed to choose between the hypotheses. As detailed in Appendix B, by applying the theory of subspace detectors, it is shown that an efficient detector for Problem (11) is
The decision to accept the alternative hypothesis is made when the statistic
is greater than threshold η. This statistic can also be written as P Z y 2 / P ⊥ Z y 2 , which represents the ratio between the energy of the observation in Z and its energy in the space orthogonal to Z . Note that the optimality properties of (12) with respect to false alarm and detection probabilities are discussed in Appendix B.
D Detection threshold and theoretical performance
Formal analysis of the impact of threshold η on the detection performance is of prime importance for two main reasons. First, it is the only way to find the right compromise between false alarms and correct detections without resorting to ad-hoc procedures relying on extensive Monte-Carlo simulations or (subjective) human inspection of the data. Second, knowledge of the detection performance is needed for higher level analysis such as population density estimation [15] . To derive the performance, we first consider the case of a single observation window of size N and then adapt it to the situation that occurs in practice when analyzing long time-series.
The probability of correct detection P det is defined as the probability that the output of test (12) is 1 when H 1 is satisfied. Similarly, the probability of false alarm P fa is defined as the probability that the output of test (12) is 1 when H 0 is satisfied. Both probabilities depend on threshold η as well as on the signal x under test. Formally, they are defined as
Analytic expressions of these probabilities are derived in Appendix C.
Detection threshold η is set so as to guarantee a given probability of false alarm. As it explicitly appears in (14) , this probability depends on the actual interference x that occurs under H 0 . For instance, T η is not very likely to mistake an earthquake sound for a Z-call because, for such a sound,
is very low. However, short impulses, such as airgun sounds whose time-frequency pattern in the 15-30 Hz bandwidth is close to a Z-call downsweep, are more likely to be mistaken for Z-calls. In this case,
is actually close to the limit τ = 15%. Therefore, in order to guarantee a user-specified probability of false alarm, whatever the time-frequency shape of the interferences that occur under H 0 , the choice of threshold η relies on the "worst-case" false alarm probability of T η , defined as
The procedure to compute α(η) is presented in Appendix D. If we are given a single observation window of size N and user-specified worst-case false alarm probability α 0 then the detection threshold η * is chosen such that α(η * ) = α 0 . However, in practice we are given 1. set the global false alarm probability to some predefined value α g , 2. compute the corresponding false alarm probability of each individual test with N samples as [29] :
. choose the threshold η * that satisfies α(η * ) = α 0 (using the method presented in Appendix D).
Note that, as shown in Appendices C and D, (15) depends on the noise covariance matrix Σ. Therefore, each time Σ changes (every 300 s. as discussed in Sec. II.D), the detection threshold is automatically updated so as to guarantee that the user-specified false alarm probability α g is not violated. In addition, from the noise covariance matrix estimate, it is also possible to tag each detection with its signal-to-noise ratio, which can be a useful metric to filter detections for post-processing.
IV Experimental results

Performance of the proposed detection method is first analyzed on the basis of the theoretical results derived in Sec. III.D. It is then illustrated through a comparison of results obtained on real data with the eXtensible BioAcoustic Tool package (XBAT) developed by the Cornell
University Laboratory of Ornithology [30] . In this section, detector (12) is termed "Zdetector" and is set with the following parameters: τ = 0.15, p = 4 and N = 15 × f s . Unless otherwise stated, its "worst-case" false alarm probability α g is to 3% and the overlap between consecutive windows is set to N − 4, which corresponds to a precision on the time-of-arrival 
A Illustration of theoretical performance
Thanks to (21) and (15), we are in position to formally quantify the achievable performance of the Z-detector (12) without resorting to Monte-Carlo simulations. Figure 4 shows the detection probability of test T η , with Σ = I N , as a function of size α 0 and for different signal-to-noise ratios (SNR). The SNR is here defined as
where x † x is the energy of the signal x, and trace(Σ) is the noise energy, computed as the sum of the diagonal elements of the noise covariance matrix Σ.
Under H 1 , the actual amount of energy of x in subspace Z is set to
75. Such a value corresponds to typical situations where there are no overlaps between Z-calls and interfering signals. Figure 4 indicates that in this case the proposed detector is very reliable for a SNR as low as -3 dB. Note, however, that this value is slightly optimistic as, for simplicity, the background noise is here chosen as white, which is rarely the case in practice.
The impact of ρ 1 on the detection performance is illustrated through Figure 5 . As expected, the better x matches the logistic model (2)- (4) the more easily T η is able to discriminate H 1 from H 0 . Overlaps of blue whale calls with high power interferences will automatically decrease the value of ρ 1 , which in turn will affect the detection performance.
B Comparison with spectrogram-based detections
As discussed in the introduction, standard methods for detecting whale calls are mostly based on spectrogram correlation techniques [5, 11, 12] . The XBAT software [30] offers such a functionality and is commonly used for analyzing blue whale calls [3, 31, 32] . Consequently, a performance comparison between detector (12) and the XBAT detector is carried out. XBAT uses a spectrogram correlation technique, in which a pre-selected template of a Z-call is used to detect similar calls in the dataset. The choice of this template is highly subjective and strongly impacts the detector performance. Here, the Z-call template was chosen in order to have the best possible performance, particularly to minimize the number of false detections. The detection threshold of XBAT is set to 20%, as in [3] , which results from a trade-off between the numbers of correct, false and missed detections. Performances of both detectors are analyzed in terms of correct-detection rate and number of false detections in comparison with calls ground-truthed by an experienced human operator (EHO). All results are listed in tables 1, 2 and 3.
To assess the performance of the Z-detector, several contexts are examined:
• data with Z-calls and background noise (various SNR) but no interference (µ = 1, ǫ = 0),
• data with Z-calls, background noise and interferences (µ = 1, ǫ = 1),
• data with background noise and interferences but no Z-call (µ = 0, ǫ = 1).
Data with Z-calls and no interference
First, performances of both detectors are compared for data with Z-calls and no interference, and for various SNR. Based on a visual analysis, the EHO has divided the data with Z-calls in 3 classes: a class with powerful Z-calls, a class with Z-calls of very low intensity (for which the 18 Hz component of the call is almost lost within the noise) and an intermediate class.
The SNR measurements reveal that for the first class, most calls have a SNR greater than 5 dB. For the class with low intensity Z-calls, the SNR is lower than -3 dB, and for the intermediate class, 90% of the calls have a SNR between 4 and -7 dB. Note that because the classes have been defined by the EHO, some SNR overlapping exists between the classes.
More than 22 hours of acoustic data have been analyzed, which results in more than 1,000 Z-calls visually detected by the EHO. Detection results for XBAT and the Z-detector are given in Table 1 . Our algorithm shows better correct-detection rates than XBAT, and therefore, lower missed-detection rates. Thus, without any interferences, the Z-detector clearly outperforms XBAT. Furthermore, for lower SNR, our algorithm has better performances, which means a better sensitivity than XBAT to detect low intensity Z-calls emitted by whales far from the hydrophone.
Note that both algorithms perform equally well in terms of false detections, with a falsedetection number that is (nearly always) null. In this context without interference, it is expected that none of the algorithms makes wrong decisions.
Data with Z-calls and interferences
The major difficulty faced by a detection method is the presence of different transient sounds in the frequency range of the signal of interest. Therefore, to assess the performance of our detector in presence of such sounds, and to compare it with the XBAT detector, we have identified different types of interferences commonly found in the dataset. They are listed in Sec. II.C and illustrated in Figure 3 . To assess the detection performance versus interference, data segments containing a single interference type are selected. Our approach differs from the method commonly used in literature, which consists in testing a detector on randomly selected datasets that are supposed to be representative of the entire database. This standard sampling methodology only provides average detection performance and is not very helpful for developing a robust detector. Consequently, similarly to [33] , we prefer to build data subsets containing particular interferences rather than randomly-chosen subsets.
The simultaneous presence of interferences and Z-calls was found only for five types of interferences: earthquakes, airguns, sounds with continuous components, unidentified recurrent transient sounds and fin whale calls. The comparison of performance has been processed on more than 35 hours of acoustic data, representing more than 1270 Z-calls.
Detailed results can be found in Table 2 . Overall, in presence of interferences, the Z-detector outperforms XBAT in terms of correct-detection rate. XBAT outperforms our algorithm only in the presence of fin whale calls, but the difference is not significant. Regarding the number of false detections, it appears that both algorithms have nearly similar performances, although
XBAT is slightly better than our algorithm.
Data without Z-calls
We also test the behavior of both detectors on data containing interferences but no Zcalls. Six types of interferences are considered: ice tremors, airguns, sounds with continuous components, unidentified recurrent transient sounds, fin whales calls and Australian pygmy blue whale calls. Note that the EHO did not find data with earthquakes only.
The comparison is made on more than 35 hours of data. Detailed results are presented in Table 3 . Once again, both detectors have relatively similar number of false detections in the presence of interferences.
Discussion
This study shows that the Z-detector has a better correct-detection rate than XBAT in almost every cases. Moreover, our algorithm is more flexible. Unlike XBAT, it is not based on a fixed template. The Z-detector automatically adapts its detection threshold to the noise conditions and it also takes into account frequency variations of blue whale calls observed intra-annually [18, [26] [27] [28] . However, this flexibility can lead to some false detections in presence of interferences. Nevertheless, both detectors have relatively similar numbers of false detections. Furthermore, it is essential to know that the performance of XBAT, especially the number of false detections, highly depends on the choice of the template. As an example, Figure 6 -a shows the false detections obtained on data with interferences with the template that has been used for this study, and Figure 6 -b, the false detections obtained on the same data and with the same threshold, but with another template used in [3] . When used on our data, the second template drastically degrades the performance of XBAT. Moreover, this performance is also affected by the actual choice of the spectrogram parameters. Finally, the choice of the detection threshold, which is critical for any detection method, is fixed and empirical for XBAT, whereas it is auto-adaptive and based on a quantitative performance criterion for the Z-detector (see Sec. III-B).
The computation time of the Z-detector is approximately 200 times faster than real-time when run on a PC with a 2.6 GHz CPU and 2 GB of RAM. In its current implementation, the detector is not optimized for computation speed: it runs with Matlab and does not benefit from parallel computing. This computation time is higher than the one required by a simple correlator with a fixed threshold (such as XBAT), but is still reasonable. 
V Conclusion
To address the problem of detecting Z-calls produced by Antarctic blue whales in the presence of interfering transient sound sources, we proposed a method that relies on signal subspace modeling. On the one hand, this model exploits the sigmoidal shape of the Z-call instantaneous frequency that can be well described analytically by a logistic function and, on the other hand, it makes very little assumptions about the signal amplitude that is very dependent on the propagation conditions. We explicitly considered the possible presence of unwanted transient signals by assuming that such signals are not orthogonal to the Z-call subspace. The proposed detection strategy was shown to present strong optimality properties with respect to false alarm and detection probabilities.
The analytic expression of the detector performance was derived to keep this performance compliant to what is specified, whatever the background noise conditions are. This is made possible by regularly estimating the noise covariance matrix and updating the detection threshold. Although the performance derivation may be tedious, the obtained results are particularly important. Such results are indeed required to interpret detection outputs in terms of statistical analysis such as cue counting or abundance estimation. As a bonus resulting from its construction, the detector is able to tag each detection with its signal-tonoise ratio, which can be a useful metric to filter detections for post-processing.
Extensive comparisons with XBAT were also conducted in various types of soundscapes.
They showed that the proposed detector has a correct-detection rate up to 15%-20% better than XBAT. Whether this improvement is significant is at the discretion of the reader. However, what is important is that the proposed detector is at least as good as a spectrogram correlator, while at the same time a) allowing for variations in the received signal, b) being robust to interferences, and c) having controlled performances.
The proposed detection strategy could also be extended to other cases in which the signal of interest is fairly simple and presents a modest amount of variability. This corresponds to typical situations where detection is performed on the basis of time-frequency masking or spectrogram correlation.
consistent at the Gaussian distribution each of these values is multiplied by the coefficient −1/ log(0.75).
Appendix B: Derivation and optimality of test (12) The derivation of a subspace detector usually relies on the identification of symmetries, or more generally invariances, of the decision problem at hand. To quote Lehmann and
Romano [40] , invariances provide natural restrictions to impose on the statistical procedures that are to be employed. For instance, problem (11) is invariant to scaling. Multiplying the observation with some constant does not change the problem at hand, i.e., the measurement remains Gaussian and the value of tolerance τ remains the same. In fact, the invariance of our problem is a bit more general than just scaling. Under H 1 , x actually belongs to a cone, whose axis is defined by subspace Z and whose angle ξ between Z and the orthogonal subspace Z ⊥ is such that cos 2 ξ = τ . Based on the observation y, problem (11) is therefore equivalent to deciding whether x belongs to this cone or not. It is known [21] that the natural invariances of a cone are scaling, rotation around its axis, and symmetry with respect to the hyperplane Z ⊥ . Such invariances can be formalized through the group
where α is an arbitrary scalar, U ⊥ Z is a N ×(N −p) matrix whose columns form an orthonormal basis for Z ⊥ and R is a (N − p) × (N − p) unitary matrix. In other words, problem (11) is invariant to G because g(y) remains Gaussian and
for all g ∈ G.
Given these invariances, it is rather natural to restrict our attention to detectors invariant to G. It is indeed desirable to find a test T such that T (g(y)) = T (y) for all y ∈ C N and all g ∈ G. One of the strongest property of optimality that could be hoped for such a test is the uniformly most powerful invariant (UMPI) property. This property states that for a given false alarm probability, the UMPI test is the one that yields the highest probability of detection among G-invariant tests.
One of the classical method for deriving the UMPI test statistic is to first identify what is known as a maximal invariant statistic and then show that it has monotone likelihood ratio [21] . A statistic M(y) is said to be maximal invariant if [21, 40] 1. it is invariant, i.e., M(y) = M(g(y)) for all g ∈ G,
2. it is maximal, i.e., M(y 1 ) = M(y 2 ) implies y 2 = g(y 1 ) for some g ∈ G.
The monotone likelihood ratio guarantees that the larger the statistic M(y) is, the more probable the alternative hypothesis H 1 looks.
Using properties of projection matrices (idempotence and U
is maximal invariant to G. Also, note that y † P Z y and y † (I N −P Z )y are independent random variables and that M(y) is a ratio of quadratic forms in projection matrices. Assume for now that the noise is white, i.e., Σ = σ 2 I N . In this case, M(y) can be expressed as the ratio of two non-central chi-square random variables. If we let γ denote the total energy of signal x, i.e., x † x ∆ = γ and ρ denote the actual percentage of its energy in subspace
. We shall now slightly modify the maximal invariant statistic
M (y) is therefore distributed according to a doubly non-central F-distribution with 2p, 2(N − p) degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameters 2γρ/σ 2 , 2γ(1 − ρ)/σ 2 . The mathematical expression of the cdf of such a distribution can be found in [41] . What is important to note here is thatM(y) follows a distribution of a known form and, above
all, that such a distribution is known to have a monotone likelihood ratio in some cases. which is large enough to attain the asymptotic regime.
Proving the optimality of test (12) 
Appendix C: False alarm and detection probabilities
Computation of false alarm and detection probabilities rely on the so-called power function.
Following standard definitions [40] , we define the power function of test T η as
Letỹ denote the whitened observation vector, i.e.,ỹ ∼ CN Σ characterized by a simple mono-dimensional integral which can be evaluated numerically or approximated using saddlepoint methods [44] .
The probabilities of correct detection and false alarm are obtained from the power function. Given any threshold η, the probability of detecting a signal x satisfying
> τ is simply obtained by computing (21) with the actual signal x under test. Similarly, the probability of wrongly detecting a signal x satisfying
τ is simply obtained by computing (21) with this signal.
Appendix D: Approximation of α(η)
In the general case, an exact expression for α(η) cannot be obtained due to the complexity of the optimization procedure involved in (15) . Maximizing the power function is difficult because the optimization is made over an N-dimensional vector x. However, an approximation can be found by noticing that the power function mainly depends on the total energy of x as well as its amount of energy in the cone rather than on its actual shape. More specifically, any signal x satisfying H 0 can be expressed as 
The worst case scenario, in terms of false alarm probability, arises when the signal x is actually on the cone rather than outside, which is equivalent to say that the supremum over ρ 0 in (24) is obtained when ρ 0 = τ . In addition, if we assume that the shape of z does not impact much the power function as long as its norm remains unitary, then the optimization is greatly simplified and can be solved as follows:
• choose any vector z ∈ C N with z = 1,
• set ρ 0 = τ ,
• maximize the power function over the scalar parameter γ, i.e. sup γ β x (T η ), with x defined as in (23) .
Note that the maximization over γ can simply be performed by searching on a grid that is bounded by the minimum and maximum signal-to-noise ratio of interferences, typically −10 ≤ 10 log 10 (γ/trace(Σ)) ≤ 20. 
